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Abstract: 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we discuss the properties of the expenditure function and compensated (Hicksian) 
demand within the theory of discrete choice with particular reference to the analysis of compensated 
variation.1 Since the theory of discrete choice is based on a random utility formulation, it follows that 
the corresponding expenditure and demand functions are random. In this paper we follow the standard 
random utility framework as set out in, e.g., McFadden (1981). Specifically, we obtain explicit 
formulae for the Hicksian choice probabilities and the distribution of the expenditure function. 
Hicksian choice probabilities have been discussed also by Small and Rosen (1981), within a somewhat 
different framework. Subsequently, we derive the distribution of the expenditure and the demand 
under price- or policy changes conditional on the utility being equal to the initial utility level. An 
immediate implication is that we readily obtain exact and convenient formulae for the distribution of 
Equivalent Variation and Compensated Variation (cv), which facilitates the analysis of welfare effects 
of changing prices or other attributes associated with the choice alternatives.  
 When the (random) utility function is nonlinear in income analytic formulae for the 
distribution of cv has so far not been available. Different approximations have been suggested in the 
literature. Morey et al. (1993) have used a representative individual approximation, while McFadden 
(1999) has developed a Monte Carlo simulator for computing cv in random utility models which 
converges to the true distribution of cv. Using this simulation method, Herriges and Kling (1999) have 
investigated the empirical consequences of nonlinear income effects based on a particular empirical 
application. Aaberge et al. (1995) have used a Monte Carlo simulation to compute equivalent 
variation. For a state-of-the-art review, see Herriges and Kling (1999) or Karlström (2001).  
 In the case where the model belongs to the additive Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) class 
the formulae become particularly simple.2 As is well known, the choice probabilities for the GEV 
model can be expressed by simple closed form formulae and when the (indirect) utility functions are 
linear in income, the so-called log-sum formula can be applied to calculate sound welfare measures. 
However, when the utility function is nonlinear in income, no analogue to the log-sum approach 
exists. 
 Let us briefly review the notion of cv in random utility models for discrete choice. Let Uj 
denote the utility of alternative j and assume that  
 , ( )j j jU v w , y= + jε
where y represents income, wj is a vector of attributes including price associated with alternative j, 
 are deterministic functions and  are random terms with joint distribution jv ( ), j 1,2,...,⋅ = j , j 1,2,...,ε =
2 
that does not depend on the structural terms { }jv ( )⋅
( )j m+ ε =
.3 Then (ignoring the choice set in the notation) cv 
is defined implicitly through 
  ( ) ( )( )0 0 1j j j j j j jmax v w , y ax v w , y cv− + ε
where { }0 0jw , y  represent initial attributes and income, and { }1jw , y  are the attributes and income 
implied by the policy. From an analytic point of view the difficulty of deriving a formula for the 
distribution of cv stems from the fact that when the new attributes { }jw  are introduced then the 
alternative that yields maximum utility may be different from the one that maximized utility initially. 
In other words, the individual agent may switch from the alternative chosen initially to a new one, 
when the policy is introduced. In this paper it is assumed that the random terms { }jε  are not affected 
by the policy intervention. This seems reasonable if the error terms { }kε  characterize tastes. It is less 
reasonable if { }kε  also includes unmeasured attributes of alternatives, which may be altered by policy. 
In general, the initial error terms { }0kε  (say), may thus differ from the error terms { }kε  (say), after 
policy. The dependence between { }0kε  and { }kε  will of course depend on the interpretation and 
modelling assumptions. For more discussion on this issue, see Heckman and Honoré (1990), 
McFadden (1999) and Carneiro et al. (2001). 
 One particular interpretation not explicitly covered by the above mentioned authors regards 
the evaluation of cv when some time has elapsed after the policy were introduced. In this case tastes 
may have changed from their initial values due to psychological factors. Dagsvik (2002) has 
considered discrete choice behavior in this type of setting. He deduces an explicit representation of the 
dependence between the error terms in two points in (continuous) time from an intertemporal version 
of the IIA assumption. This extended version of IIA accommodates serially dependent error terms due 
to what can be interpreted as taste persistence.  
 In addition to analysing the properties of cv, we derive formulae for the joint distribution of 
cv, the initial choice, and the choice after the policy intervention. This is useful in situations where one 
wishes to analyze how a specific policy may induce transitions from the initial chosen alternative to a 
new alternative, given that the utility level is kept unchanged. The distribution of cv is also useful for 
computing welfare measures based on weighted population means, as discussed by Hammond (1990). 
 When the utility function is linear (or separable) in income then the calculation of the mean 
cv becomes simple, at least within the GEV class, as mentioned above. 
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 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the discrete choice framework is presented, 
and in Section 3 compensating choice probabilities and the random expenditure function are defined 
and the corresponding distribution functions are derived. In Section 4 we derive compensated choice 
probabilities and the distribution of the expenditure function under price changes conditional on a 
utility level equal to the initial level under different assumptions about the random terms of the utility 
function. In Section 5 we discuss how the results obtained above can be extended to the case where the 
structural part (  of the utility function depends on random coefficients. In Section 6 we treat the 
special case where the random terms of the utility function are multivariate extreme value distributed, 
and in Section 7 we consider the case with independent and identically extreme value distributed 
random terms. Section 8 discusses the application of the results obtained to particular examples. 
)jv
2. The setting 
We consider a setting in which a consumer faces a set B of feasible alternatives (products), which is a 
subset of the universal set S of alternatives, { }S 1,2,...,M= . The consumer’s utility function of 
alternative j is assumed to have the form 
(1)  ( )U v w yj j j= +, ε j
}
where  denotes income and wj is a vector of attributes including price of alternative j. The 
function vj(⋅) is assumed to be continuous, decreasing in the first argument and strictly increasing in 
the second, and it may depend on j. 
y 0>
 Let FB(⋅) denote the joint cumulative distribution function of { . We assume that 
 possesses a continuous density. Thus the probability of ties is zero.  
Bk,k ∈ε
)(F)(F S ⋅≡⋅
 We shall first assume that the joint distribution of { }kε  does not depend on ( ){ }k kv w , y . 
This may, however, be restrictive in some applications. Suppose for example that 
( ) (j j j jv w , y v w , y;= )β  where β is a random coefficient. In this case the utility structure can be 
expressed as  
 j( ) *j j jU E v w , y;β= β + ε  
where Eβ denotes the expectation with respect to β and the new error term  is defined by *jε
 j( ) ( )*j j j j jv w , y; E v w , y;βε = β − β + ε . 
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We thus realize that in this case the error terms { }*kε  become dependent on ( ){ }k kv w , y;β . In Section 
5 we discuss how to treat cases like this. 
 It is well known that one can express the Marshallian choice probabilities (i.e. the choice 
probabilities that correspond to Marshallian demand) by a simple formula. For notational simplicity, 
write { }B 1,2,...,m= . Then the Marshallian choice probabilities are given by 
(2)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )BB j k j 1 1 2 2 m mk BP j, , y P U max U F u v w , y ,u v w , y ,...,u v w , y du∈≡ = = − − −w
where  denotes the partial derivative with respect to xj and . 
Here it is understood that income and prices, (y,w) are given. 
(Bj 1 2 mF x ,x ,..., x ) ( )1 2 mw ,w ,...,w=w
 If { }k , k Bε ∈  are random variables with multivariate extreme value distribution, then GB 
defined by 
(3) ( )( ) ( )B 1 2 m k k
k B
exp G x ,x ,..., x P x y,
∈
 
− ≡ ε ≤  w  
has the property4 
(4)  ( ) (B z B1 2 m 1 2 mG x ,x ,..., x e G x z,x z,..., x z−= − − )−
for  The corresponding Marshallian choice probability is given by z R∈ .
(5) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
B
j 1 1 2 2 m m
B B
1 1 2 2 m m
G v w , y , v w , y ,..., v w , y
P j, , y .  
G v w , y , v w , y ,..., v w , y
− − −
= −
− − −
w
)
)
This formula is well known and is found in a completely equivalent form in for example McFadden 
(1981). 
 
 Remark 
 When the joint distribution of (  is a multivariate extreme value distribution, 
type III, then the marginal distribution of Uj has the form 
1 2 MU , U ,...,U
  ( ) (( )j jP U u exp exp v u≤ = − − τ
for , where vj and  are parameters.5 This implies that one can write u R∈ 0τ >
5 
  j jU vτ = + ε j
)
kε
where 
 . ( ) ( )xjP x exp e−ε ≤ = −
This means that when  is multivariate extreme value distributed the utility function has 
an additive structure in the sense that each random term is distributed according to the standardized 
(type III) extreme value distribution . 
( 1 2 MU , U ,...,U
exp( )xe−−
3. The random expenditure function and Hicksian (compensated) 
choice probabilities 
We now proceed to discuss the notion of random expenditure function that corresponds to the above 
setting. 
 It is immediate from (1) that the indirect utility function 
(6)  ( ) ( )( )B k kk BV , y max v w , y∈≡ +w
has (for given { }kε
BV
) the standard properties of such functions deduced by Roy (1947), and exploited 
by McKenzie (1957), Diewert (1974), Varian (1992) and others. Specifically, so long as local non-
satiation holds,  is quasi-convex and homogenous of degree zero in prices and income, non-
increasing in prices, and increasing in income, and can be inverted to give an expenditure function 
 satisfying the identity 
( , yw )
)
)
(BY ,uw
(7) . ( )( )B Bu V ,Y ,u= w w
The function  is concave and linear homogeneous in prices and increasing in u, and by 
Shephard’s lemma satisfies almost surely the property that its price derivatives exist almost 
everywhere and equal the Hicksian demands (provided suitable differentiability conditions hold). 
These propositions hold under very general conditions, including the case of discrete alternatives; see 
Diamond and McFadden (1974), and McFadden (1978b). 
(BY ,uw
 The general properties listed above are, however, not immediately practical for deriving the 
distributional properties of the expenditure function and the Hicksian choice probabilities. Instead of 
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starting by defining the expenditure function through (7) we find it more convenient and intuitive to 
start with the slightly more rigorous formulation 
(8) ( ){ }B BY ( ,u) z:V ,z u .= =w w  
In (8) the expenditure function is given as a set, but we shall see below that this set is a singleton. The 
expenditure function given in (8) can be readily computed as follows. Let  be 
determined by 
( )k k kY w ,u − ε
(9)  ( )( )k k k k k kv w ,Y w ,u u.− ε + ε =
Due to the fact that  is strictly increasing in y,  is uniquely determined. The 
interpretation of  is as the expenditure required to achieve utility level u, given 
alternative k with attributes wk. We realize now that the expenditure function can be expressed as 
(k kv w , y
(k kY w ,u − ε
) )
)
k .ε
(k k kY w ,u − ε
k
(10)  ( ) ( )B k kk BY ,u min Y w ,u∈= −w
It therefore follows that with probability one the set YB(w,u) is a singleton. Thus, the expenditure 
function can be defined uniquely by (8). 
 We shall see below that the setup above is very useful. 
 
 Theorem 1 
 Let { }=B 1,2,...,m
),uw
>m,..., y 0
. The expenditure function, , is uniquely defined by (8), 
continuous in ( , increasing in the price components of w and strictly increasing in u. Moreover, 
if is concave in the price component for all k,  is concave in prices. For 
, 
(BY ,uw
(BY ,uw
)
)
m m
),( ywv kk
> >1 20, y 0y
(11)  
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
− > − > − >
= − − −
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 m m m m
B
1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
P Y w ,u y ,Y w ,u y ,...,Y w ,u y
F u v w ,y ,u v w ,y ,...,u v w ,y .
ε ε ε
Furthermore, the distribution of the expenditure function is given by 
(12) , ( ) ( ) ( )( )v v v≤ = − − − −BB 1 1 2 2P Y ( ,u) y 1 F u w , y ,u (w ,y),...,u w ,yw
for . u R, y 0∈ >
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  For the sake of bringing out the central arguments we have chosen to present the proof below 
instead of deferring it to the appendix. 
 
 Proof: 
 From (9) it follows that since  is continuous in y and the price component of wk, 
decreasing in the price component of wk and strictly increasing in y that  is continuous in x 
and the price component of wk, increasing in the price component of wk and strictly increasing in x; 
see for example Rudin (1976), Theorem 4.17. Hence  is continuous in u and the price 
component of wk, increasing in the price component of wk and strictly increasing in u. It follows 
immediately from duality theory that if  is convex in the price component then  
will be concave in the price component. Due to the fact that B is finite it follows from (10) that 
 will also be continuous in u and the price components of w, increasing in the price 
components of w and strictly increasing in u. Since minimum of concave functions is concave (10) 
also implies that  is concave in prices. Furthermore, since  is strictly increasing in 
y we realize that (9) implies that 
(k kv w , y
(k kv w , y
)
)
)
)
)
(k kY w ,x
)
( )k kw , y
(k k kY w ,u − ε
v
( )k kY w , x
(BY ,uw
(BY ,uw
 ( ){ } ( ){ }k k k k k kY w ,u y v w , y u− ε > ⇔ + ε < . 
Hence, for , we get from (10) that 1 2 my 0, y 0,..., y 0> > >
  
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
k k k k k k k k
k Bk B
B
1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
P Y w ,u y P v w , y u
F u v w , y ,u v w , y ,...,u v w , y ,
∈∈
    − ε > =  + ε <    
=
− − −

which proves (11). Eq. (12) then follows immediately from (10) and (11) by setting  for all k. ky y=
  Q.E.D. 
 
 The result in (12) is quite intuitive since (9) and (10) yield that 
 . ( )( ) ( )( )B BP Y ,u y P V , y u≤ = ≥w w
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The event ( ){ }BY ,u y≤w  means that the amount y is higher than or equal to the expenditure required 
to achieve utility level u. Evidently, this event is equivalent to ( ){ }BV , y u≥w . The latter event is the 
statement that the utility implied by income y is higher than⎯or equal to u. 
 By imposing differentiability conditions on ( ){ }k kv w , y  one can sharpen the result of 
Theorem 1 to yield almost surely differentiable expenditure function in prices, as mentioned above. 
 The notion of Hicksian- or compensated choice probabilities does not seem to have appeared 
previously in the literature. Our definition of this concept follows next. Let  denote the 
choice from B given attributes and income ( ) . 
(BJ , yw )
)
, yw
 
 Definition 1 
 By Hicksian choice probabilities, ({ }hBP j, ,uw , we mean 
 . ( ) ( )( )( )≡ =hB B BP j, ,u P J ,Y ,u jw w w
 
 The interpretation of  is as the probability of choosing  given that the utility 
level is given and equal to u. For example, if prices change the consumers are ensured income 
compensation so as to maintain a given utility level. 
(hBP j, ,uw )
k
j
j B∈
 Note that the Hicksian choice probabilities can also be expressed as 
(13) . ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )hB j j j B j j j k kk BP j, ,u P Y w ,u Y ,u P Y w ,u min Y w ,u∈= − ε = = − ε = − εw w
 
 Theorem 2 
 The Hicksian choice probabilities can be expressed as 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )∞= − − −h BB j 1 1 2 2 m m j
0
P j, ,u F u v w ,y ,u v w ,y ,...,u v w ,y v w ,dyw
for . ∈u R
 
 Proof: 
 From (13) and (11) in Theorem 1 we obtain that 
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(14)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) { } ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
{ }
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
j j j B B
j j j k k kk B\ j
j j j k k k
k B\ j
B
j 1 1 2 2 m m j j
P Y w ,u Y ,u ,Y ,u y, y dy
P Y w ,u y, y dy , min Y w ,u y
P Y w ,u y dy, y , Y w ,u y
F u v w , y ,u v w , y ,...,u v w , y v w ,dy .
∈
∈
− ε = ∈ −
 
= − ε ∈ − − ε ≥  
 
= − ε ∈ − − ε ≥   
= − − −
w w

The result now follows by integration with respect to y. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 From Theorem 2 we realize that one can calculate the Hicksian choice probabilities readily 
provided the cumulative distribution FB(⋅) is known since only a one dimensional integral is involved 
in the formulae for . ( )hBP j, ,uw
 To bring out the symmetry of the Marshallian and Hicksian choice probabilities, recall that 
similarly to (14) one has that 
(15)   , ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )BB B j 1 1 2 2 m mP J , y j,V , y u,u du F u v w , y ,u v w , y ,...,u v w , y du= ∈ + = − − −w w
from which the corresponding Marshallian choice probability follows by integration. Thus the only 
difference between (14) and (15) is the “Jacobian” , , associated with the choice j. This 
Jacobian is due to the change of variable from uj to yj, where . 
(j jv w ,dy)
( )j j j ju v w , y=
 The next result is useful for calculating moments of the expenditure function. 
 
 Lemma 1 
 Let H be a probability distribution. Then for any  ≥ 1α
 ( ) ( )( )∞ ∞ −= −  1
0 0
x d H x x 1 H x dxα αα  
where the two sides exists or diverge together. 
 
 The result of Lemma 1 is well known, but for the reader’s convenience we provide a proof in 
the appendix. 
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 Corollary 1 (Shephard’s Lemma) 
 Suppose ( ) (= − )j j j 1 jv w , y y w ,wψ 2 j , for some suitable function ψj that is continuously 
differentiable in the first argument, where w1j is the price (user cost) associated with alternative j and 
w2j denotes other attributes. Suppose furthermore that  for all . Then 
, and 
( )− < ∞k k kEY w ,u ε ∈k S
( ) < ∞BEY ,uw
 ( ) ( )∂ =∂
B h
B
1 j
EY ,u
P j, ,u
w
w
w . 
 
 Proof: 
 Note first that 
 
( ) ( ) ( )j j j jj1 1j 2 j
1j
v w , y v w , y
y w ,w
w y
∂ −
= −ψ − =
∂ ∂
∂
)
 
where  denotes the derivative with respect to (j1 2 jx, wψ [ )x, x 0,∈ ∞ . Since 
 for any  the expectation of the expenditure function is finite. 
Hence, by Lemma 1 and (12) 
( )B k,u EY≤w ( kEY w ,u )k− ε k B∈
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
B B
1 1 2 2 m m 1j
1j 0
j jB h
j 1 1 2 2 m m B
0
EY ,u
F u v w , y ,u v w , y ,...,u v w , y dy w
w
v w , y
F u v w , y ,u v w , y ,...,u v w , y dy P j, ,u .
y
∞
∞
 ∂
= ∂ − − − ∂ ∂  
∂
= − − − =
∂


w
w
 
Above, integration under the integral sign is possible, since the integrand is continuous and the 
integral evidently converges. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 We recognize the result of Corollary 1 as a probabilistic (or aggregate) version of 
Shephard’s Lemma. It states that the partial derivative of the aggregate expenditure function with 
respect to the price of alternative j yields the fractional compensated demand. The structure 
 of the systematic part of the utility of alternative j is quite general and covers the 
standard discrete choice settings. This is in contrast to the corresponding duality result in the 
Marshallian case. As McFadden (1981) has discussed, the Marshallian choice probabilities follow 
(j 1jy w ,wψ − )2 j
11 
from the mean indirect utility function, by means of Roy’s identity, only when utility is linear in 
income. 
4. The probability distribution of the expenditure function and 
the choice under price changes conditional on the initial utility 
level 
We shall next consider the problem of characterizing the distribution of the expenditure function and 
the choice probabilities when the utility level equals the (indirect) utility under prices and income that 
differ from the current prices and incomes. To this end we consider a two period setting. In period one 
(the initial period) the attributes and income are . In the second period (current period) the 
attributes and income are . As above, it is assumed that the respective random terms remain 
unchanged under attribute changes. In general, when attributes change it may yield a decrease or an 
increase in the agent’s indirect utility. Furthermore, the highest utility may no longer be attained at the 
alternative chosen initially, and consequently the agent will switch to a new alternative, namely the 
one that maximizes utility under the new attribute regime. In the current setting, however, the 
(indirect) utility level is kept fixed and equal to the initial level. But the agent may still switch from the 
initially chosen alternative to a new one because, after the attributes change, the utility of the initially 
chosen alternatives may no longer coincide with the new indirect utility. 
( 00 y,w )
)
) ))
)
)
) )
( 1, yw
 Let us first consider the joint distribution of the initial choice and the current expenditure 
given that the utility level is equal to the initial utility level. Formally, this is the joint distribution of 
. The interpretation of  is as the expenditure 
function conditional on the utility level that corresponds to income level y0. 
( )( ) (( )0 0 0 0B B BY ,V , y ,J , yw w w (( 0 0B BY ,V , yw w
 
 Theorem 3 
 Let  and  be defined by  ( )0 0i i iy w ,y ,w ( 0 0i i ih w ,y ,w ,y
  ( ) (( )=0 0 0 0i i i i i i iv w , y v w ,y w ,y ,w
and 
 . ( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0 0 0i i i i i i ih w ,y ,w ,y max v w ,y ,v w , y=
The joint distribution of  and (( )0B BY ,V ,yw w ( 0 0BJ , yw  is given by 
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 ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) (( )
∈
> =
= + = +
= − − −
0 0 0 0
B B B
0 0 0 0
i i i i k k k kk B
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
P Y ,V ,y y,J , y i
P h w , y ,w , y max h w ,y ,w ,y
)F u h w ,y ,w , y ,u h w ,y ,w ,y ,...,u h w ,y ,w ,y du
ε ε
w w w
 
for  When  ( ).∈ < < 0 0i i ii B, and 0 y y w ,y ,w ( )≥ 0 0i 1 iy y w ,y ,w
 . ( )( ) ( )( )0 0 0 0B B BP Y ,V ,y y, J , y i 0> =w w w =
 
 From Theorem 3 we notice that the joint distribution of the expenditure, given the initial 
utility level, and the initial choice, can be expressed as a choice probability. 
 Although the result of Theorem 3 follows from Theorem 4 below we have given an 
independent proof of Theorem 3 in the appendix. This is of interest because it demonstrates that if one 
is only interested in the distribution of the expenditure function there is no need to proceed via the 
result of Theorem 4, which is more complicated to prove than the result of Theorem 3.  
 The intuition of the result of Theorem 3 can be perceived as follows: Since 
 ( )( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }0 0 0 0B B B BY ,V , y y V , y V , y> ⇔ <w w w w  
it follows that the alternative that is chosen initially has utility that is the highest utility initially and 
also higher than the highest utility in the second period. Hence, if alternative i is chosen initially and 
current expenditure is higher than y it must be true that , and ( ) (0 0i i i iv w , y v w , y> )
) )
)
 . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0i i i i i i i B B k k k kk Bv w , y h w , y ,w , y max V , y ,V , y max h w , y ,w , y∈+ ε = + ε = = + εw w
 From Theorem 3 we immediately obtain the conditional distribution of  
given the initial choice . Note also that  implies that 
( )( )0 0B BY ,V , yw w
( 0 0BJ , yw ( 0 0i i iy y w , y ,w<
 . ( ) (0 0 0 0i i i i ih w , y ,w , y v w , y=
 To state the next result it is convenient to apply the following notation 
(16)  ( ) ( ) ( )0 0k k k k0 0k k k 1 if v w , y v w , y ,I w , y ,w , y
0 otherwise.
 <
= 
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 The next corollary follows from Theorem 3 by summing over . i B∈
 
 Corollary 2 
 The distribution of  is given by (( )0 0B BY ,V , yw w )
)
)
)
)
)
  
( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (( )
∈
= − − − 
0 0
B B
0 0 B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i i i i 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
i B
P Y ,V ,y > y
I w ,y ,w ,y F u h w , y ,w , y ,u h w ,y ,w ,y ,...,u h w ,y ,w ,y du
w w
for . >y 0
 
 Note that it follows from Theorem 3 that 
  ( )( )( )0 0B BP Y ,V , y y 0> =w w
when 
 . ( )0 0i i ii By max y w , y ,w∈≥
 Recall that the Compensation Variation measure (cv) is defined as 
 . ( )( )1 0B Bcv y Y ,V , y= − w w
The distribution of cv thus follows directly from Corollary 2. 
 Let  denote the current choice from B, given the current and initial prices and 
income ( , and given that the current utility level equals the initial one, . Thus, 
 is defined by 
(* 0 0BJ , y ,w w
)00 y,
),w
, ww
( 0yw
( 0 0BV , yw
* 0
BJ ,
 . ( ) (( )( )* 0 0 0 0B B B BJ , y , J ,Y ,V , y=w w w w w
 Let us next consider the joint distribution of the current expenditure, the current and the 
initial choice, given that the utility level is kept equal to the initial utility level. That is, we shall 
consider the joint distribution of . ( )( ) ( ) (( )0 0 0 0 * 0 0B B B BY ,V , y ,J , y ,J , y ,w w w w w
14 
 The reason why we consider the joint distribution of the expenditure and the initial and 
current choices, given that the utility level is equal to the initial utility level, is that it may be of 
interest in policy simulations because it enables us to calculate cv conditional on the initial- or current 
choice, or both.  
 
 Theorem 4 
 Let 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }v v0 0 0 0k k k kC , y , , y k : w ,y w , y= ≥w w . 
We have that 
  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (( )v
∈ = =
= − − −
0 0 0 0 * 0 0
B B B B
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
j j ij 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
P Y ,V ,y dy,J , y i,J , y j
w ,dy F u h w ,y ,w , y ,u h w ,y ,w ,y ,...,u h w ,y ,w ,y du
w w w w ,w
)
)
=
0= =
)
when , where Fij denotes the derivative of F with respect to 
components i and j. When  
( ) (∈ ∈0 0 0 0i B \ C ,y , , y , j C ,y , , yw w w w
( )0 0i B \ C ,y , , yw w ( )∉ ∉ 0 0, j C , y , , yw w
 , ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0 0 0 * 0 0B B B BP Y ,V , y dy, J , y i, J , y , j 0∈ = =w w w w w
For , and ,  = ∈j i B ( ), ,= 0 0i i iy y w y w
 . ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )0 0 0 0 * 0 0B B B B BP Y ,V ,y y, J , y J , y i P i, , y= = = =w w w w ,w w
When , ( ), ,≠ 0 0i i iy y w y w
 . ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , , , ,0 0 0 0 * 0 0B B B BP Y V y dy J y J y i∈ =w w w w w
 
 A proof of Theorem 4 is given in the appendix. 
 
 Note that we have expressed the result of Theorem 4 as a differential of the c.d.f. If 
 is differentiable with respect to income the corresponding joint density exists. (j jv w , y
15 
 When y is such that  and  are non-empty, the agent must 
switch from the initial chosen alternative i (say) in  to an alternative within 
 to achieve , unless . This is so because 
 contains the most attractive alternatives in the initial period while  
contains the most attractive alternatives in the current period. Equivalently, if  then 
( )0 0C , y , , yw w
(( )0 0B BY ,V , yw w
( 0 0B \ C , y , , yw w
( 0 0B \ C , y , , yw w
dy i iy y w=
)
)
) )
)
>
)
)
)
)
)
)w
( 0 0C , y , , yw w
( 0 0B \ C , y , ,w
) ∈ ( 0 0 i, y ,w
j
yw ( )0 0C , y , , yw w
i≠
  ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0 0 0 * 0B B B BP Y ,V , y dy, J , y i, J , y , j 0∈ = =w w w w w
if  and . Otherwise this probability 
equals zero. 
( ) (0 0 0 0j j j i i iy w , y ,w y w , y ,w< ) ( ) (0 0 0 0j j j i i iy w , y ,w y y w , y ,w≤ <
 The result of Theorem 3 shows that only a one-dimensional integral is needed to calculate 
the joint probability density of 
  ( )( ) ( ) (( )0 0 0 0 * 0 0B B B BY ,V , y , J , y , J , y ,w w w w w
provided  is known. However, in cases where one only has closed form expressions for 
the density of , such as in the Multinomial Probit case, a  dimensional integral 
is needed to calculate . 
(Bij 1 mF x ,..., x
(B 1 2F x ,x ,
B
ijF
m..., x
1x ,...,
m 2−
( )mx
 The result of Theorem 3 enables us to calculate compensating “transition” probabilities 
given by 
 . ( ) ( )( )0 0 * 0 0B BP J , y i, J , y , j= =w w w
This expression represents the probability of going from i to j when attributes change from w0 to w, 
given that the utility level is kept fixed and equal to the initial utility, , and given that the 
error terms remain unchanged. Specifically, we have that the joint probability of choosing i initially 
and j in the current period equals 
( 0 0BV , yw
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) (( )
( )
( )0 0i i i
0 0
j j j
y w ,y ,w
0 0 * 0 0 0 0 0 0 * 0 0
B B B B B B
y w ,y ,w
P J , y i, J , y , j P Y ,V , y dy, J , y i, J , y ,= = = ∈ =w w w w w w w
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where the integrand in the above integral is given in Theorem 4. From this expression the conditional 
probabilities of the current choice given the initial choice follows. In some cases it may be of interest 
to calculate the fractions of such “compensated” transitions that follow from a specific policy 
intervention. Furthermore, one can similarly calculate the change in the choice probability given that 
the utility level is kept equal to the initial utility level. The latter expression equals 
  ( )( ) ( )( )* 0 0 0 0B BP J , y , j P J , y j= − =w w w
for . j B∈
 
 Remark 
 The results obtained in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 are derived under the assumption that the 
choice set B is the same before and after the price change. However, these results can be slightly 
modified to apply also in cases where the choice set changes. Suppose for example that alternative 2 
was available initially but is removed as part of a policy intervention. One can conveniently 
accommodate for this by letting w2 become very large so that  becomes very small. As a 
result we obtain that 
(2 2v w , y)
)0  ( ) (0 02 2 2 2 2h w , y, w , y v w , y=
and that 
 . ( )0 02 C y , y, ,∉ w w
 From Theorem 3 and Lemma 1 it follows that the mean and variance of  
can be calculated by the formulae 
( )( )0 0B BY ,V , yw w
(17)     
( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
0 0
i i i
0 0
B B
y w ,y ,w
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
i B 0
E Y ,V , y
= F u h w , y ,w , y ,u h w , y ,w , y ,...,u h w , y ,w , y du dy,
∈
− − −  
w w
and 
17 
(18)     
( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
0 0
i i i
2
0 0
B B
y w ,y ,w
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
i B 0
E Y ,V , y
= 2 y F u h w , y ,w , y ,u h w , y ,w , y ,...,u h w , y ,w , y du dy.
∈
− − −  
w w
5. Models with random coefficients 
Above we assumed that the random terms of the utility function were independent of the respective 
structural terms. We shall now relax this assumption. Specifically, we now suppose that 
 ( )j j jU v w , y;= jβ + ε  
where the notation above means that the systematic part (j jv w , y; )β  depends on a vector of 
parameters β which are random and distributed on a suitable space. We assume, however, that β is 
independent of ( . A special case of this type of models is the so-called Mixed Multinomial 
Logit Model (MNL). The mixed MNL model has recently become popular because it provides a very 
general random utility modeling framework that is convenient to apply in empirical applications, see 
McFadden and Train (2000). 
)1 2, ,...ε ε
 We realize that Theorem 3 still holds when β is given, i.e., 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) (( )
0 0 0 0
B B B
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
P Y ,V , y y, J , y i
F u h w , y ,w , y; ,u h w , y ,w , y; ,...,u h w , y , w , y; du
> = β
= − β − β − β
w w w
)
 
for ( )0 0i i i0 y y w , y .w ;< < β , where ( 0 0i i iy w , y ,w ; )β  is determined by 
 ( ) ( )( )0 0 0 0 0i i i i ii i iv w , y ; v w , y w , y ,w ; ;β = β β  
and 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0 0 0j j j j j j jh w , y , w , y; max v w , y; ,v w , y ;β = β β . 
Consequently, we get 
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B B B B B B
0 0 B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i i i i 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
P Y ,V , y y, J , y i EP Y , V , y y, J , y i
I w , y , w , y; F u h w , y , w , y; , u h w , y , w , y; ,..., u h w , y , w , y; f ( )du d
> = = > = β
= β − β − β − β β β
w w w w w w
 
where f(β) is the probability density of β and  
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 0i i i i0 0i i i 1 if v w , y; v w , y ;I w , y ,w , y;
0 otherwise.
 β < ββ = 
 
Note that the interpretation given in Theorem 3 still holds in this case. 
 The corresponding results for Theorem 4 and the results given above are completely 
analogous. 
6.  Specialization to the case with multivariate extreme value dis-
tributed error terms 
McFadden (1978a) introduced the GEV class of models that follows if F is a multivariate extreme 
value distribution function. The GEV class represents no essential restrictions on the class of random 
utility models, since Dagsvik (1994, 1995) and Joe (2001) have demonstrated that one can 
approximate any random utility model arbitrarily closely by GEV models. This class contains the well 
known Multinomial Logit and Nested Logit models which has proven to be very important in applied 
work. 
 We shall state how the general results obtained in Theorem 4 simplifies in the case where 
F(⋅) is a multivariate extreme value distribution. For simplicity, we only state the joint density of 
  ( )( ) ( ) (( )0 0 0 0 * 0 0B B B BY ,V , y , J , y , J , y ,w w w w w )
).w
for the case when 
  ( ) (0 0 * 0 0B BJ , y J , y ,≠w w
 
 Corollary 3 
 Suppose F(⋅) is a multivariate extreme value distribution. Then 
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 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
v
0 0 0 0 * 0 0
B B B B
B B B B
ij i j j j
2B
P Y ,V ,y dy,J , y i,J , y j
G G G G w ,dy
G
∈ =
−
=
   

w w w w ,w =
)
)
)
)
)
)
 
when , where ( ) (≠ ∈ ≤0 0 0 0j j j i i ii j, i, j B and y w ,y ,w y < y w ,y ,w
  ( ) ( ) (( )= − − − B B 0 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 2 2 2 m m mG G h w , y ,w ,y , h w ,y ,w , y ,..., h w ,y ,w ,y ,
  ( ) ( ) (( )= − − − B B 0 0 0 0 0 0i i 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m mG G h w , y ,w ,y , h w ,y ,w , y ,..., h w ,y ,w ,y ,
  ( ) ( ) (( )= − − − B B 0 0 0 0 0 0ij ij 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m mG G h w , y ,w ,y , h w ,y ,w , y ,..., h w ,y ,w ,y ,
and GB(⋅) is defined in (3). 
 
 The proof of Corollary 3 is given in the appendix. 
 
 Thus, the result of Corollary 3 implies that in the case where the random terms are 
multivariate extreme value distributed, one can rather easily compute the joint density of the 
expenditure function and JB and . Note that no integration is needed here. *BJ
 The next corollary follows directly from Theorem 3. 
 
 Corollary 4 
 Suppose F(⋅) is a multivariate extreme value distribution. Then we have, for , and 
, that 
∈i B
( )< < 0 0i i i0 y y w , y ,w
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) (( )
( ) ( ) (( )
> =
− − −
= −
− − −
0 0 0 0
B B B
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
P Y ,V ,y y,J , y i
G h w , y ,w ,y , h w ,y ,w ,y ,..., h w ,y ,w ,y
G h w , y ,w ,y , h w ,y ,w ,y ,..., h w ,y ,w ,y
w w w
 
and 
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 ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
)
∈
>
= −

0 0
B B
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0B
i i i 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m mi
i B
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
P Y ,V ,y y
I w ,y ,w ,y -h w ,y ,w ,y ,-h w ,y ,w ,y ,...,-h w , y ,w ,yG
G -h w ,y ,w , y ,-h w , y ,w ,y ,...,-h w ,y ,w ,y
w w
 
for . >y 0
 
 From eq. (17), Lemma 1 and Corollary 4 we obtain that 
(19) 
( )( )
( ) ( ) (( )
( ) ( ) (( )
)
)
( )0 0i i i
0 0
B B
y w ,y ,w B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i B 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
EY ,V , y
G h w , y ,w , y , h w , y , w , y ,..., h w , y , w , y dy
.
G h w , y ,w , y , h w , y ,w , y ,..., h w , y ,w , y∈
− − −
= −
− − −
 
w w
 
Thus, formulae (19) can be applied to compute the mean Compensating Variation 
  ( )( )1 0B By E Y ,V , y− w w 0
M
under the assumption of Corollary 4. 
7. Specialization to the case with i.i. extreme value distributed er-
ror terms 
When the error terms are i.i. extreme value distributed the Marshallian choice probabilities reduce to 
the Luce model- or the Multinomial Logit model. In this case the distribution of  
becomes particularly simple. 
( )( )0 0B BY ,V , yw w
 From Corollary 4 we immediately get the next result. 
 
 Corollary 5 
 Suppose  are independent and standard extreme value distributed. Then for 
, and  
1 , ,..., ,2ε ε ε
( )0 0i iy w , y ,w∈i B < < i0 y
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
v
,
v v
0 0
i i0 0 0 0
B B B
0 0
k k k k
k B
exp w , y
P Y ,V y y, J , y i
exp max w ,y , w ,y
∈
> = = w w w  
and 
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 ( )( )( ) ( ) (( )( ) ( )( )( )
), v
,
v v
0 0 0 0
i i i i i
0 0 i B
B B 0 0
k k k k
k B
I w ,y w ,y exp w ,y
P Y ,V y y
exp max w , y , w ,y
∈
∈
> =

w w  
for . >y 0
 
 From eq. (17), Lemma 1 and Corollary 5 we obtain that 
(20)  ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )0 0i i iy w ,y ,w
0 0 0 0
B B i i 0 0
i B 0 k k k k
k B
dyE Y ,V , y exp v w , y .
exp max v w , y ,v w , y∈
∈
=  w w  
 Similarly to eq. (19), eq. (20) can be applied to compute the mean Compensating Variation  
  ( )( )1 0B By E Y ,V , y− w w 0
in the case where the random utilities have i.i. extreme value distributed error terms. 
8. Examples 
 Example 1 
 Consider a Nested Logit model with 4 alternatives where joint c.d.f. of the error terms of the 
utilities is given by 
(21) ( )( ) ( )( )31 2 4xx x x1 2 3 4exp G x ,x ,x ,x exp e e e e θ− θ− − − θ− = − − − +  
where  and  has the interpretation as the correlation between the error terms of the 
utilities of alternatives three and four. For simplicity, write . We then get 
( ]0,1θ∈ 21− θ
( 0 0j j j jh (y) h w , y ,w , y= )
 
( )
( ) ( )
i
31 2 4
h (y)
i 1 2 3 4
h (y)h (y) h (y) h (y)1 2 3 4
G h (y), h (y), h (y), h (y) e
G h (y), h (y), h (y), h (y) e e e e
θθ θ
− − − −
− =
− − − − + + +
 
for { }i 1,2∈ ,  and 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
3 4 i
31 2 4
1h (y) h (y) h (y)
i 1 2 3 4
h (y)h (y) h (y) h (y)1 2 3 4
e e eG h (y), h (y), h (y), h (y)
G h (y), h (y), h (y), h (y) e e e e
θ−θ θ θ
θθ θ
+
− − − −
− =
− − − − + + +
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for { }i 3,4∈ . Recall that  when . From Corollary 3 we get that ( 0 0i i ih (y) v w , y= ) )( 0 0i i iI w , y ,w , y 1=
(22) 
( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
0 0 0 0
i i i i3 4
31 2 4
0 0
B B
2 410 0 0 0
i i i i i i
i 1 j 3
v w ,y v w ,yh (y) h (y)
h (y)h (y) h (y) h (y)
P Y ,V , y y
I w , y ,w , y e e e I w , y , w , y e
,
e e e e
θ−
= =
θ
θθ θ
θ θ
>
+ +
=
+ + +
 
w w
 
for . Furthermore, the corresponding mean expenditure follows from (19) and equals y 0>
(23) 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
0 0 0 0
i i i i i
31 2 4
0 00 0
i ii i i 3 4
31 2 4
y w ,y ,w v w ,y2
0 0
B B h (y)h (y) h (y) h (y)i 1 0
1 v w ,yy w ,y ,w h (y) h (y)4
h (y)h (y) h (y) h (y)i 3 0
e dyE Y ,V , y
e e e e
e e e dy
.
e e e e
θθ θ
=
θ− θθ θ
θθ θ
=
=
+ + +
+
+
+ + +
 
 
w w
 
When  we get the Multinomial Logit model. In this case we immediately see that (22) and (23) 
are indeed consistent with Corollary 5 and (20). 
1θ =
 
 Example 2 
 In this example we assume that a new alternative enters the choice set in the current period. 
The setting in the initial period is as in Example 1, while in the current period the joint c.d.f. is given 
by 
(24) ( )( ) ( )( )( )3 51 2 4x xx x x1 2 3 4 5exp G x ,x ,x , x ,x exp e e e e e θ− θ − θ− − − θ− = − + + + +  
where alternative 5 denotes the new alternative. Thus (21) follows from (24) by letting  in (24). 
As mentioned above, results obtained in this paper can still be used to find the distribution of the 
expenditure function. This is obtained formally by assuming that also 5 alternatives are available 
initially, thus 
5x = ∞
{ }B 1,2,3,4,5= , with . This implies that , 
for all y. Therefore, a straight forward extension of (22) and (23) with I , yields 
( )0 05 5v w , y = −∞ ( )5 , y v=
0=
( )0 05 5 5 5h w , y , w w , y
( )0 05 5 5w , y ,w , y
23 
(25)    
( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
0 0 0 0
5 53 4i i i i
5 53 41 2
0 0
B B
2 41v w ,yh (y) h (y)0 0 0 0v w ,y v w ,y
i i i i i i
i 1 i 3
v w ,yh (y) h (y)h (y) h (y)
P Y ,V , y y
I w , y , w , y e e e e I w , y , w , y e
e e e e e
θ−θθ θ θ
= =
θθθ θ
>
+ + +
=
+ + + +
 
w w
 
for , and y 0>
(26) 
( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )
0 0 0 0
i i i i i
31 2 4 5 5
0 00 0 i i 5 53 4i i i
5 51 32 4
0 0
B B
y w ,y ,w v w ,y2
h (y)h (y) h (y) h (y) v w ,yi 1 0
1v w ,y v w ,yh (y) h (y)y w ,y ,w
4
v w ,yh (y) h (y)h (y) h (y)i 3 0
E Y ,V , y
e
ee e e e
e e e e
.
e e e e e
θθ θ θ=
θ−θ θθ θ
θθθ θ
=
=
+ + + +
+ +
+
+ + + +
 
 
w w
dy
 
 
 Example 3 
 In this example the initial setting is as in Example 1, while in the current period alternative 4 
has been removed and is no longer available. Similarly to Example 2 this case is dealt with by letting 
{ }B 1,2,3,4= ,  so that , and  for all y. As a 
result we obtain from (22) and (23) that 
( )4 4v w , y = −∞ ( )0 04 4 4h (y) v w , y= ( 0 04 4 4I w , y ,w , y 1=)
(27)     
( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i i 4 4 3 3 4 43
0 0
4 431 2
0 0
B B
12 v w ,y v w ,y v w ,y v w ,yh (y)0 0 0 0
i i i 3 3 3
i 1
v w ,yh (y)h (y) h (y)
P Y ,V , y y
I w , y ,w , y e e e I w , y ,w , y e e
e e e e
θ−
θ θθ
=
θ
θθ
>
+ + +
=
+ + +

w w
θ
 
for , and y 0>
(28) 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
0 0 0 0
i i i i i
0 0
4 431 2
0 0 0 0
4 4 i i0 0 3i i i
0 0
4 431 2
y w ,y ,w v w ,y2
0 0
B B
v w ,yi 1 h (y)h (y) h (y)0
1
v w ,y v w ,yh (y)y w ,y ,w
4
v w ,yi 3 h (y)h (y) h (y)0
e dyE Y ,V , y
e e e e
e e e d
e e e e
θ
θ
= θ
θ−
θ θθ
θ
θ
= θ
=
+ + +
+
+
+ + +
 
 
w w
y
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where . ( )0 04 4 4y w , y ,w = ∞
 
 Example 4 
 Suppose that the error terms of the utility function are i.i.d. with extreme value c.d.f., and 
 ( ) ( )j j jv w , y y w a= jγ − +  
where 0γ >  is a parameter and aj is a term that is supposed to capture non-pecuniary aspects of 
alternative j. In this case it is well known that 
(29) ( )( ) 0 0k k k kw a w a0 0B B 0
k B k B
1 1E Y ,V , y y log e log e−γ + −γ +
∈ ∈
  
= + −  γ γ   w w
 . 
We shall now use the result of Corollary 4 to compute the c.d.f. of .  ( )( )0 0B BY ,V , yw w
(30)     
( )( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
0 0 0
i i
0 0 0
i i i i
0 0
B B
y w a0 0
i i i
i B
y w a w a0 0 y 0 0
i i i i i i
i B i B
P Y ,V , y y
I w , y ,w , y e
I w , y ,w , y e e 1 I w , y ,w , y e
γ − +
∈
γ − +
−γ +γ
∈ ∈
>
=
+ −

 
w w
 
where 
 ( )
0
0 0 i i
i i i0 0
i i i
a a1 if y y y w w
I w , y ,w , y
0 otherwise.
 −
< ≡ + − +
= γ
 
Consider finally (30) in the special case when { }B 1,2,3=
3y y≥ I
. Suppose that . Then it follows 
that , for i 1  when  and , for  when 
. Therefore 
2 1y y y< <
( ) 1= i 1=
3
3
2
( )0 0i i iI w , y ,w , y 0=
2y
,2,3,= 0 0i i iw , y ,w , y ,2,3,
y <
(31) , ( )( )( )0 0B BP Y ,V , y y 0, for y y> = ≥w w
 , ( )( )( )0 0B BP Y ,V , y y 1, for y y> = <w w
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(32) ( )( )( ) 0 00 3 30 00
3 3 1 1 2 2
y w a
0 0
B B y w a a w a wy
eP Y ,V , y y
e e e e
γ −γ +
γ −γ + −γ −γγ
> =  + + 
w w  
when , and 1 3y y y< <
(33) ( )( )( ) 0 00 0 00 3 31 1 0 00 0 00
3 31 1 2 2
y w ay w a
0 0
B B y w ay w a y w a
e eP Y ,V , y y
e e e
γ −γ +γ −γ +
γ −γ +γ −γ + γ −γ +
+
> =
+ +
w w  
when . 2 1y y y≤ <
 Let us finally check that we get (27) when we use (20) and (31) to (33). For notational 
simplicity let j j jb a w= − γ  and 0 0j j 0jb a w= − γ . Then we have that 0 0j jy y b bjγ = γ + − , and 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )
00 00
031 031 3
0 00 0 00
3 31 2 1
2 1
y by b yy y b
0 0
B B 2 y b y by b y b b by
y y
e e dy e dyEY ,V , y y
e e e e e e e
γ +γ + γ +
γ + γ +γ + γ + γ
+
= + +
+ + + +
 w w 2 . 
By multiplying the numerator and the denominator of the respective integrands by  we realize that 
integration is immediate and the last expression reduces to 
ye−γ
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3 31 2 1 2
2 1
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1 1 3 1 1 2 3 22 2
0 0 00
3 3 3 11 2
yy
y b y b yy b b b by
2
y y
b y y b y y b y y b y yb b
2
b y y b y yb b b
1 1y | log e e e e | log e e e
1 1y log e e e log e e e
1 1log e e e log e e
γ + γ + −γγ + −γ
+γ − +γ − +γ − +γ −
+γ − +γ −
− + + − + +
γ γ
  
= − + + + + +  γ γ  
 
− + + + + γ γ  ( )

( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
1 2
0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 21 2 2
0 0
3 3 1 11 2 1 2
00 0 0
3 31 2 2 2 1 2
00 0
31 2
b
0
b b b b b b b b bb b b0 2 2
b b b bb b b b
0
b bb b b b b b0 2 2
bb b0
e
b b 1 1y log e e e log e e e
1 1log e e e log e e e
b b 1 1y log e e e e log e e e
1 1y log e e e log
+ − + − + −
+ −
−
+
−
= + − + + + + +
γ γ γ
− + + + + +
γ γ
−
= + + + + − + +
γ γ γ
= + + + −
γ γ ( )31 2 bb be e e+ +
 
which is equal to (29). 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper we have demonstrated that the notion of random expenditure function and compensated 
choice probabilities can be readily adapted within a discrete choice setting. We have moreover derived 
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convenient analytic formulae for the Hicksian choice probabilities and the distribution of the 
Expenditure function and Compensating Variation. In particular we show that an aggregate version of 
Shephard’s Lemma holds under rather general conditions. We have considered several special cases in 
detail. When the model belongs to the GEV class the formulae simplifies. As argued by McFadden 
(2001), this method it to be preferred to using simulations. Finally, we have discussed several 
examples. Although we have focused on Compensating Variation in this paper, the derivation of the 
distribution of Equivalent Variation is completely analogous.  
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Footnotes: 
1 Karlström (1998) and Dagsvik (2001) have independently obtained many of the same results as in 
this paper, although the proofs are different. 
 
2 See McFadden (1978). 
 
3 Note that the present notation accommodates the specification  for some 
function 
( ) (j 1jj j ,wv w ,y y w= ψ − )2 j
jψ  that may depend on j, w2j represents non-pecuniary attributes and w1j the price (or user 
cost) associated with alternative j. 
 
4 In addition GS must satisfy a number of regularity conditions to ensure that  is 
a proper distribution function, cf. McFadden (1978). 
( )( )S 1 Mexp G x ,..., x−
 
5 Here we adopt the definition of type I, II and III extreme value distributions used by Resnick (1987). 
Other authors use different enumerations. 
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Appendix 
 
 Proof of Theorem 3: 
 Recall first that 
 ( ){ } ( ){ }B BY ,u y V , y u> ⇔ <w w  
which implies that 
 ( )( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }0 0 0 0B B B BY ,V , y y V , y V , y> ⇔ <w w w w . 
If , the last event implies that . Moreover, ( )0 0BJ w , y i= ( ) (0 0i i i iv w , y v w , y> )
)
  
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) { } ( )( ) { } ( )( )
( ) { } ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
0 0 0 0
B B B
0 0 0 0
B B i i i
0 0 0 0
i i i k k k k k kk B\ i k B\ i
0 0 0 0
i i i k k k kk B\ i
0 0 0 0
i i i k k k kk B
P Y w,V w , y y,J w , y i
P V w, y V w , y v w , y
P v w , y max max v w , y , max v w , y
P v w , y max h w , y ,w , y
P h w , y ,w , y max h w , y , w , y
∈ ∈
∈
∈
> =
= < = + ε
  
= + ε ≥ + ε + ε    
 
= + ε ≥ + ε  
= = + ε
= ( ) ( ) (( )B 0 0 0 0 0 0i 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m mF u h w , y ,w , y ,u h w , y ,w , y ,...,u h w , y ,w , y du.− − −
This completes the proof. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 4: 
 Consider the event 
( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) { } ( )( ) ( ) { } ( )( ) ( ){ }
0 0 0 0 * 0 0
B B B B
0 0 0 0
j j j B B i i i
0 0 0 0 0 0
j j j i i i k k k i i i k k k j j
k B\ i k B\ j
Y , V , y y, J , y i, J , y , j
v w , y V w, y V w , y v w , y
v w , y v w , y , max v w , y v w , y , max v w , y v w , y .
∈ ∈
= = =
⇔ + ε = = = + ε
⇔ + ε = + ε + ε ≤ + ε + ε ≤ + ε
w w w w w
j
This implies that j  and i  which is 
equivalent to 
 
( ) ( )0 0j j j j jv w , y v w , y+ ε ≥ + ε
( ) ( )0 0j j j jv w , y v w , y≥  and i iv w , y
( ) ( )0 0i j i i iv w , y v w , y+ ε > + ε
( )0 0i iv w , y . ( ) <
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 It follow
(A.1)
s next that for small Δy 
0 0 0 0 * 0 0
Now recall that since  and  we have that 
. As a result the probabilities above 
(A.2)
0 0 0 0
e realize that the last expression has the structure as the difference of two choice probabilities (apar
from ). Hence, (A.3) can be written as 
 
which yields 
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(A.3)      
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (( )
0 0 0 0 * 0 0
B B B B
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
j j ij 1 1 1 2 2 2 m m m
P Y ,V , y dy,J , y i, J , y , j
v w ,dy F u h w , y ,w , y ,u h w , y , w , y ,...,u h w , y ,w , y du
∈ = =
= − − −
w w w w w
)
)
+ ε
)
)
)
for  and , and zero for , 
, . 
( )0 0i B \ C , y , , y∈ w w
( )0 0j C , y , , yw w ji ≠
( 0 0j C , y , , y∈ w w ( )0 0i B \ C , y , , y∉ w w
∉
 For j  it follows that i=
(A.4)  
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for . Moreover, the expenditure function in this case has measure zero outside the 
point . 
( 0 0i i iy y w , y ,w=
( )0 0i i iy w , y ,w
 Note finally that  and  means that 
 and , which is equivalent to 
. 
( )0 0i B \ C , y , , y∈ w w
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( )0 0i iw , y ,w
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 This completes the proof. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Lemma 1: 
 Suppose first that 
 . 
0
x d H(x)
∞
α < ∞
Then for any b 0≥  
(A.5) . ( )
b b
x d H(x) b d H(x) b 1 H(b)
∞ ∞
α α α≥ = − 
When  the left hand side of (A.5) tends towards zero, which yields b → ∞
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(A.6) . ( )
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Using integration by parts we obtain that 
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so that the right hand side of (A.9) also exists. Suppose next that 
 . 
0
x d H(x)
∞
α
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Then (A.7) implies that also 
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∞ . ( )1
0
x 1 H(x) dx
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Hence we have proved that (A.8) holds in either case. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Corollary 3: 
 From Theorem 4 and homogeneous property of  when FB is a multivariate extreme 
value distribution we get, with , 
Blog F
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From this result the result of Corollary 3 follows. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
